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CHAPTER 15 
Constitutional Law 
DWIGHT GOLANN* 
CHARLES WYZANSKI** 
CIVIL CONSTITUTIONAL LA wt 
§ 15.1. Declaration of Rights- Article 9- Access to the Ballot. The Bill 
of Rights in the United States Constitution protects the rights of private 
persons against interference by the state. Absent "state action," the Bill 
of Rights is not applicable. When interpreting similar provisions in the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the Supreme Judicial Court tends to 
follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court. 1 The state court, of 
course, is bound by federal constitutional interpretations, but it may 
invoke the state constitution when providing greater safeguards for the 
rights guaranteed in the federal and state constitutions. 2 
During the Survey year in Batchelder v. Allied Stores International, 
Inc., 3 a narrow majority of the Supreme Judicial Court took a potentially 
significant step toward broadening the application of the Declaration of 
Rights. The Court held that, in some circumstances, the Declaration of 
Rights protects a person's rights from interference by private parties as 
well as by the state. 4 Unlike federal law, therefore, the Massachusetts 
Constitution may apply to situations where there is no "state action." 
The case arose when Donald Batchelder, a candidate for Congress of 
the Citizens' Party, entered the North Shore Shopping Center ("North 
Shore") to distribute leaflets and solicit signatures in an effort to obtain a 
place on the ballot. 5 Batchelder solicited signatures in common areas of 
* Dwight Golann is Chief of the Consumer Protection Division of the Massachusetts 
Department of the Attorney General. 
** Charles Wyzanski is an Assistant District Attorney in Middlesex County. 
t Dwight Golann 
§ 15.1. 1 Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in 
Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 
887, 889 (1980). 
2 Id. 
3 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983). 
4 Id. at 89, 445 N.E.2d at 593. 
5 Id. at 84-85, 445 N.E.2d at 591. The North Shore is the largest shopping center in 
Massachusetts. I d. at 85, 445 N.E.2d at 591. It consists of ninety-five retail stores and an 
enclosed mall, together with other facilities ranging from a bowling alley to a chapel. Id. 
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the center in "an orderly and quiet manner" for a half-hour, when he was 
stopped by a security guard employed by the mall owner, Allied Stores.6 
Batchelder brought suit, claiming that he had been deprived of his state 
constitutional right to solicit signatures in support of ballot access. 7 The 
superior court found for North Shore, and Batchelder appealed. 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld Batchelder's constitutional right to 
solicit signatures in support of ballot access in the North Shore. 9 The 
Court first determined that federal constitutional law was neutral on the 
issue, noting that a person has no federal right to distribute handbills in a 
privately-owned shopping mall. 1° Finding no federal mandate or restraint, 
the Court then considered whether the plaintiff had any greater rights 
under the Massachusetts Constitution.U Analyzing article 9, which 
guarantees free elections and equal access to the vote and to public 
office, 12 the Court concluded that, unlike the first amendment to the 
federal Constitution, article 9 is not directed only against government 
action. 13 The Court found no "state action" requirement in article 9 and 
rejected any suggestion that the Declaration of Rights should be read as 
directed exclusively toward restraining government action. 14 Conse-
quently, the Court found that Batchelder had a constitutional right to 
solicit signatures in the North Shore. 15 At the same time, the Court 
North Shore regularly sponsors a variety of civic and entertainment events, including 
exhibits, fairs and band concerts. I d. All of the shopping center's facilities and events are 
open to the public. It has been the policy of North Shore to permit candidates already on the 
ballot to appear at the mall and shake hands with voters but to forbid solicitation of 
signatures for any purpose. ld. at 85-86, 445 N.E.2d at 592. 
6 Id. at 85, 445 N.E.2d at 591. 
7 Id. at 84, 445 N.E.2d at 591. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 93, 445 N.E.2d at 596. 
10 Id. at 87, 445 N.E.2d at 592. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (repudiating 
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Union 
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968)). 
11 Batchelder, 388 Mass. at 87, 445 N.E.2d at 593. 
12 See MAss. CoNST. part I, art. IX, which provides that "[a]ll elections ought to be free; 
and all the inhabitants of the commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall 
establish by their frame of government, have an equal right to elect officers, and be elected, 
for public employments." 
13 388 Mass. at 88, 445 N.E.2d at 593. 
"Id. 
15 Id. at 92, 445 N.E.2d at 595. It is not clear why the Court found that article 9 was 
violated on the facts of this case. The opinion noted that, "North Shore has consistently 
applied a nondiscriminatory ·policy concerning political campaigning. No solicitation of 
signatures is permitted. Candidates already on the ballot may appear at the shopping center 
and shake hanlls with voters." Id. at 86, 445 N.E.2d at 592. 
As the dissent pointed out, it is not at all apparent how this policy interfered with the 
plaintiff's right to "free" or "equal" elections. See id. at 96-97,445 N.E.2d at 597 (Lynch, 
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stressed that the mall owner retained the right to place reasonable lim-
itations on the time, place and manner of any ballot solicitation. 16 
The Batchelder decision represents a potentially significant develop-
ment in Massachusetts constitutional law. It is the latest of several Su-
preme Judicial Court decisions that have interpreted the Declaration of 
Rights more broadly than the United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted corresponding provisions of the federal ConstitutionY Exactly 
how important Batchelder will be depends on whether the Court extends 
its holding to the other provisions of the Declaration of Rights and 
whether the Court extends its protection of the exercise of constitutional 
rights to property less clearly public than a major shopping mall. In order 
for the principles of Batchelder to have a major effect on future litigation, 
the Court will have to develop clear guidelines by which to weigh the 
competing claims in such cases. 
The Court will probably be reluctant to apply Batchelder to provisions 
other than article 9 of the Declaration of Rights. Three judges dissented in 
the case, and the author of the dissenting opinion, Justice Lynch, took the 
opportunity in a case decided later in the Survey year to stress that "the 
[state and federal] constitutional provisions ... give rights to the citizens 
which may not be infringed by the government.'' 18 The justices of the 
Supreme Judicial Court thus do not appear to have resolved the "state 
action" issue and there is obvious resistance to extending the scope of the 
Batchelder holding. If the Court were to extend its ruling, it probably 
would do so first in cases involving freedom of speech 19 and freedom of 
assembly. 20 
J., dissenting). It may be that the Court understood article 9 to impose a positive obligation 
on private persons to facilitate electoral activity. More likely, the majority applied that 
article to Batchelder's claim because, as discussed below, the Court was unwilling to 
address the plaintiff's troublesome free speech and free assembly arguments. 
18 Jd. at 93, 445 N.E.2d at 595. 
17 See, e.g., Attorney General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 796-98, 444 N .E.2d 915, 919-20 
(1982) (self-incrimination clause of the Declaration of Rights imposes greater requirements 
on an attempt by the Commonwealth to compel testimony than does fifth amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution). 
18 Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 390 Mass. 604, 608,459 N.E.2d 80, 83 (1983) (emphasis 
in original). The Spence case involved a suit by the Boston Housing Authority against the 
state Department of Public Utilities for alleged violations of the Authority's constitutional 
rights. Jd. at 605, 459 N.E.2d at 81. 
19 See MASS. CoNST. part I, art. XVI, which provides: "[T]he liberty of the press is 
essential to the security offreedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this 
commonwealth. The right of free speech shall not be abridged." 
•o See MASS. CoNST. part I, art. XIX, which provides: "[T]he people have a right, in an 
orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good; give instruc-
tions to their representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses, 
petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they 
suffer." 
3
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In Batchelder, the Court avoided addressing the issues of free speech21 
and assembly. 22 Later in 1983, however, the Court decided Common-
wealth v. Hood, 23 which squarely presented the question of whether 
articles 16 and 19 of the Declaration of Rights, which guarantee freedom 
of speech and of assembly, apply to private property. 24 In Hood, four 
persons were convicted of trespass after they entered on the premises of a 
defense contractor, Charles Stark Draper Laboratories, Inc., ("Draper 
Laboratories") to distribute leaflets advocating nonviolence as a means to 
avert nuclear war. 25 The defendants were arrested after refusing to leave 
an outdoor courtyard on the property, which was open to public pedest-
rian and automobile traffic but bore "No Trespassing" signs. 26 The de-
fendants claimed that their convictions violated their rights to freedom of 
religion, speech and assembly under articles 1, 16 and 19 of the Massa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights as well as under the corresponding provi-
sions of the federal Constitution. 27 The Hood Court again avoided deciding 
whether article 16 contains a state action requirement. The Court stated 
that regardless of whether state action is required, article 16 does not 
apply in the Hood case because of the nature of Draper Laboratories. 28 
Draper is a private business, and the leafletting occurred during regular 
business hours. Permitting members of the public to pass through the 
Draper Laboratories property, the Court noted, did not change the essen-
tially private nature of the premises. 29 According to the Hood Court, 
Batchelder does not suggest that the protections of articles 16 and 19 
extend to such private premises. 30 
In addition, article 114, the recently adopted constitutional amendment that bars discrimi-
nation against otherwise qualified handicapped persons "under any program or activity 
within the .commonwealth," may also apply in purely private circumstances. 
21 388 Mass. at 88, 445 N.E.2d at 593. 
22 The Batchelder Court noted, but refused to reaffirm, a statement in a 1978 decision that 
"[a]rticles 16 and 19 protect the rights of free speech and assembly from abridgement by the 
government. Therefore guarantees of those articles do not extend to . . . conduct . . . which 
occurred on the property of a private employer." I d. at 89 n.8, 445 N.E.2d at 593 n.8 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Noffke, 376 Mass. 127, 134, 379 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (1978)). The 
Batchelder Court dismissed this language as "dictum" and distinguished Noffke in other 
respects, but did not overrule it. ld. at 89-90 n.8, 445 N.E.2d at 593 n.8. The Court also 
declined in Batchelder to address the scope of article 19, noting that the issue had not been 
briefed. I d. at 92 n.ll, 445 N .E.2d at 595 n.ll. · 
23 389 Mass. 581, 452 N.E.2d 188 (1983). 
24 Id. at 584, 452 N.E.2d at 191. 
25 Id. at 583, 452 N.E.2d at 190. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 584, 452 N.E.2d at 191. 
28 Id. at 585, 452 N.E.2d at 191. 
29 Id. at 586, 452 N.E.2d at 192. 
30 I d. at 585,452 N.E.2d at 191. The question of what would constitute "state action," if it 
were required, was addressed by the Court twice in 1983, in Hood, 389 Mass. at 581, 445 
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Although the Hood Court, in dicta, dismissed the applicability of 
Batchelder to articles 16 and 19,31 the rationale used in Batchelder to find 
no state action requirement under article 9 applies equally well to articles 
16 and 19. The Batchelder Court found that article 9 applied to private as 
well as government parties because the provision did not explicitly refer 
to governmental action. 32 Neither article 16 nor article 19 makes any 
reference to state action. 33 The reasoning in Batchelder therefore should 
result in extension of the no state action requirement to articles 16 and 19. 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court did not explain its reluctance to 
address the issues of free speech and freedom of assembly on private 
property, the Court may have been concerned about the problems of 
balancing and policing the exercise of these rights. The solicitation of 
signatures to gain access to a ballot is carried on only during election 
periods, and the relatively few people who seek to become candidates are 
not likely to behave disruptively because of their desire to gain public 
support. The rights of free speech and assembly, on the other hand, apply 
to all people at all times and to many activities, ranging from political 
meeting to nude dancing. In addition, under the federal Constitution, 
"speech" may not be regulated on the basis of its content or subject 
matter. 34 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Judicial Court 
has avoided deciding whether the state action requirement applies to the 
speech and assembly provisions of the Declaration of Rights. 
The future impact of the Batchelder decision will depend not only on 
whether the Supreme Judicial Court finds no state action requirement in 
articles 16 and 19, but also on whether the Court is willing to apply the 
holding to private properties less obviously "public" than the common 
areas of a major shopping center. In the majority opinion in Batchelder, 
Justice Wilkins stressed that the common areas of North Shore were 
N.E.2d at 188 (defense laboratory not shown to serve a "public function" or to be in a 
"symbiotic relationship" with state), and Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 390 Mass. 
652, 459 N .E.2d 453 (1983) (discharge of employee by juvenile program which was supported 
by Commonwealth was not "state action"). In Phillips, the Court suggested that a "due 
process" claim under article 12 of the Declaration of·Rights probably would require state 
action, in part because that article refers explicitly to "the law of the land." I d. at 658, 459 
N.E.2d at 457-58. 
31 Hood, 389 Mass. at 585, 452 N.E.2d at 191. 
32 388 Mass. at 88-89, 445 N.E.2d at 593. 
33 See supra notes 20-21. In contrast, U.S. CoNST. amend. I, provides that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... ," and U.S. CoNsT. amend. 
XIV provides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .... " 
114 See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92,95 (1972), and cases cited therein. 
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voluntarily exposed to intense community use, 35 and that Batchelder's 
actions did not adversely affect the economic interests of the shopping 
center's owners or tenants. 36 In the Hood case, on the other hand, the 
Court was unwilling to find that leafletters had a constitutional right to 
access to the outer courtyard or parking lot of a private employer. 37 There 
are, however, many types of property that lie somewhere between the 
quasi-public North Shore and the private Draper Laboratories. College 
campuses, sports facilities and exhibition halls, for instance, are open to 
the public, and their owners usually cannot demonstrate a convincing 
interest in excluding political activity and speech from these facilities. The 
Supreme Judicial Court could well extend the Batchelder holding to cover 
such properties. In New Jersey, for example, the state supreme court held 
that Princeton University, a private institution, had violated the state 
constitution by invoking trespass laws to prevent a person from distribut-
ing political literature on campus. 38 Future plaintiffs in Massachusetts 
may also seek access to privately-owned entities such as mobile home 
parks, migrant labor camps, retirement communities and large apartment 
and condominium complexes, on the grounds that they are self-contained 
communities that have many of the attributes of a municipality. 39 
Relying on Batchelder, the Massachusetts courts could also decide that 
commercial advertisers must sell space for political advertising on 
billboards, common carriers, and other advertising spaces. 40 It is, how-
ever, highly unlikely that Batchelder will be applied to require newspap-
ers and other media with specific editorial content to accept political 
advertising, since the press has specifically and jealously guarded coun-
tervailing constitutional rights. 41 In short, the Batchelder decision may 
35 388 Mass. at 92, 93 & n.l2, 445 N.E.2d at 595 & n.l2. In practice, most of the litigation 
concerning the exercise of constitutional rights on private property has involved shopping 
centers. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. 
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 
230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981). 
36 388 Mass. at 93, 445 N.E.2d at 595. 
37 See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. 
38 State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), cited in Batchelder, 388 Mass. at 90, 
445 N .E.2d at 594. The Batchelder Court also cited Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 
A.2d 1382 (1981) (prosecution of nonstudents for entering private college campus, and 
picketing and distributing leaflets to protest the appearance of a government official at a 
campus symposium, held barred by Pennsylvania constitution). 
39 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). 
40 Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (a municipality has no first 
or fourteenth amendment obligation to open its buses to political messages, where there is a 
"risk of imposing on a captive audience" and the municipality can demonstrate a consistent 
policy of carrying only commercial and service advertising). 
41 See U.S. CoNST., amend. I; MAss. CoNST. part I, art. XVI. See also Miami 
Herald Publishing Corp. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
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provide the precedent for finding that political candidates have a constitu-
tional right of access to a variety of quasi-public facilities and to certain 
advertising opportunities. 
It is difficult to predict with any specificity how the Batchelder opinion 
will influence future litigation because the Supreme Judicial Court did not 
formulate any general principles that could be applied in other factual 
contexts. Decisions by other state supreme courts, however, some of 
which were cited by the Batchelder Court, have identified several factors 
to be considered in such cases. The first factor is the private owner's 
economic and privacy interests in the property, taking into account the 
nature and use of the property. 42 The second factor is the nature of the 
constitutionally protected activity, and whether it can be carried out by 
other means. 43 The third factor is the injury that the activity will cause to 
private interests, in light of the owner's ability to impose reasonable time, 
place and manner restrictions. 44 
In summary, the Batchelder decision reaffirms the willingness of the 
Supreme Judicial Court to interpret state law broadly to protect individual 
rights in contexts in which the United States Constitution has been held 
not to apply. On the specific issue of "state action," however, the ma-
jority's emphasis on the facts of the case- ballot access solicitation at a 
major shopping center- and the Court's reluctance to extend free speech 
guarantees in a similar manner in other cases suggests that the Court will 
be very cautious in applying its ruling to other constitutional rights or 
other types of property. The Court's failure to establish general guidelines 
for balancing the competing interests in Batchelder also makes it difficult 
to predict how the Batchelder holding will be applied in other cases. 
§ 15.2. The Establishment Clause - State Aid to Parochial Schools. The 
Supreme Court has established a three-part test for determining whether 
state aid to parochial schools is constitutional. 1 During the Survey year, in 
Taunton Eastern Little League v. City of Taunton, 2 the Supreme Judicial 
42 See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899,903-04,592 P.2d 341, 346-48, 
153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856-58 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 
555-57, 423 A.2d 615, 630-33 (1980), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 
445 U.S. 100 (1982); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 
240-42, 635 P.2d 108, 116-17 (1981). 
43 See supra note 42. 
44 See supra note 42. In Massachusetts, the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution and article 10 of the Declaration of Rights restrain the state from 
authorizing incursions on private property which are so extensive as to amount to a 
"taking" or to a denial of due process. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 
74, 82-85 (1980). No state court, and particularly not the Batchelder majority, has even 
approached this constitutional limitation. 
§ 15.2. 1 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
2 389 Mass. 719, 452 N.E.2d 211 (1983). 
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Court stretched the test as far as possible without actually permitting the 
transfer of state funds to parochial schools. In Taunton Eastern Little 
League, the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the constitutionality of a 
city's decision to protect the revenues of a parochial school in order to 
avoid possible increased burdens on its public school system. Although 
the Court relied on established precedents in aid-to-religion cases, it 
applied those precedents in a manner that may have opened a new avenue 
for indirect state aid to religious schools. 
The case arose when the Taunton Eastern Little League ("Little 
League") applied to the city for a license to conduct beano games. 3 The 
city council allowed the application, but then rescinded its approval in 
response to petition from a local Catholic parish. The parish already held 
a beano license for the same night and wanted to prevent any loss of 
revenue by competition from the Little League. 4 The city council's revo-
cation of the Little League's license was explicitly intended to protect the 
parish's beano revenues, which supported a Catholic grammar school run 
by the parish. 5 The council was concerned that loss of those revenues 
could force the school to close, which would substantially increase the 
demand on the city's public school system. 6 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Taunton city council was 
entitled to prefer the parish over the Little League because the council's 
action did not have the effect of advancing religion. 7 Because the plaintiff 
did not raise any state constitutional issues, the Court only considered 
whether the city's decision violated the first amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 8 Following established precedent, the Court applied a 
3 Id. at 720-21, 452 N.E.2d at 212. 
4 Id. at 721, 452 N.E.2d at 212-13. 
5 Id. at 721, 452 N.E.2d at 213. 
6 ld. 
7 Id. at 725, 452 N.E.2d at 213. 
8 See id. at 722 & n.3, 452 N.E.2d at 213 & n.3. In particular, the plaintiff presented no 
claim under the "anti-aid" amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 722, 452 
N.E.2d at 213. See MAss. CoNST. amend. art. XVII,§ 2, as amended by art. CIII. The Court 
suggested in its opinion that the plaintiff erred by not citing article 18 and by failing to 
challenge G.L. c. 38, § 10. See Taunton Eastern Little League, 389 Mass. at 724-25, 452 
N.E.2d at 214. Chapter 38 requires that all profits from beano games licensed under its 
authority ''shall be used for charitable, religious or educational purposes ..... ''The Court 
stated, "[a]bsent a challenge to the statute, the plaintiff cannot argue that funds received by 
a parochial school from a beano game constitute state financial aid to religion." I d. It is not 
clear, however, that by limiting the permissible uses of beano profits, the Legislature 
intended to authorize discrimination in favor of religious entities. 
The Court also suggested that a contrary result in Taunton Eastern Little League would 
have prevented the city from denying the plaintiff a license for any reason, for example, as 
part of a neutral policy to prefer existing licensees. Id. at 727, 452 N.E.2d at 216. If the city 
had adopted such a policy, however, the "effect" at issue would have been that of the 
overall policy, rather than its application in any particular case. 
8
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three-part test to the city council's action: "[f]irst, the [action] must have 
a secular ... purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [action] must 
not foster an 'excessive government entanglement with religion.' " 9 
The Court had little difficulty in finding that the first and third criteria of 
this test were met. According to the Court, the city's ultimate purpose of 
avoiding a burden on the public schools was secular, 10 and the decision to 
award or deny a license was unlikely to result in excessive entanglement 
with religion. 11 The most serious question involved the second criterion, 
whether the principal or primary effect of the city's decision was to 
advance religion. 12 The Court held that even though the council's decision 
did "result in an indirect benefit to a religion, that benefit was incidental" 
to the secular purpose of avoiding a sudden influx of students into the 
public school system. 13 Having found that the Taunton city council's 
revocation of the Little League's beano license met the three-part test, the 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the council's right to prefer the Catholic 
parish in granting beano licenses. 
The Supreme Judicial Court thus balanced the secular purpose of the 
Taunton city council's decision against its religious effect. By doing so, 
the Massachusetts Court departed from United States Supreme Court 
precedents, which call for comparing the secular effect of a governmental 
action against its religious effect to determine which is primary. In this 
case, the effect on a religious institution of increasing parish revenues 
should have been compared to the effect of the decision to deny a license 
on secular institutions. 14 
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
for example, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a New York statute that granted maintenance funds to private 
schools, and tuition reimbursements and tax credits to parents who enrol-
led children in private schools. 15 The Court noted that New York had 
acted out of a real and substantial "concern for an already overcrowded 
9 389 Mass. at 722, 452 N.E.2d at 213 (citing e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
612-13 (1971)). 
10 See id. at 723, 452 N.E.2d at 213-14. 
11 See id. at 728, 452 N.E.2d at 216. 
12 Id. at 724, 452 N.E.2d at 214. 
13 Id. at 725, 452 N.E.2d at 215. 
14 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), 
where the Court stated that '' [ o ]ne factor of recurring significance in this weighing process is 
the potentially divisive political effect of an aid program." /d. at 795. The Supreme Court 
went on to explain that what is at stake in establishment clause cases is preventing the strife 
and strain on a political system that can be caused by state support of a religious institution. 
Id. at 796. 
15 Id. at 756. 
9
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public school system." 16 The Supreme Court stressed, however, that 
"the propriety of a legislature's purposes may not immunize from further 
scrutiny a law which ... has a primary effect that advances religion." 17 
Finding that the direct subsidies and indirect tax and tuition grants in the 
New York program had the "inevitable effect of subsidizing sectarian 
schools," the Court struck them down. 18 In Taunton Eastern Little 
League, the Supreme Judicial Court also found that the city had a real 
concern for the public school system, but the Court then failed to give 
"further scrutiny" to the effect that supporting the Catholic Church's 
beano game could have on religious and secular institutions. 
The Taunton Eastern Little League Court justified its holding, and 
distinguished Nyquist and other federal precedents, on the ground that the 
Taunton city council "did not provide public funds to [the] parish." 19 This 
distinction is a tenuous one. It is true that the city wrote no checks to the 
parish or its members. There is little doubt, however, that by granting the 
parish an exclusive beano license, the city conferred a valuable gov-
ernmental benefit on a religious charity. In so doing, the council explicitly 
discriminated against a secular non-profit group. The effect of that deci-
sion was to increase the revenues of the Catholic Church at the expense of 
a community institution. 
If the Taunton decision is representative of how the Supreme Judicial 
Court will apply the three-part test in establishment clause cases, the 
possibilities for state aid to parochial schools in the Commonwealth have 
been expanded. State and local governments have discretion to award a 
wide variety of permits and franchises, many of them more valuable than 
a beano license. 20 State legislatures have become increasingly inventive in 
their approach to parochial school aid, and more efforts at indirect assis-
tance following the Taunton Eastern Little League decision may therefore 
be expected. 21 
16 Id. at 773. 
17 Id. at 774. 
18 Id. at 779-80, 794. 
19 389 Mass. at 723, 452 N.E.2d at 213-14. 
20 One commentator has observed that a key issue in aid-to-religion cases is the breadth of 
the class benefitted by the governmental decision. Programs affecting a large group contain-
ing predominantly secular entities will be accorded greater presumptive validity than an 
action that benefits a narrow class consisting primarily of religious organizations. L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 845 (1978). Under this test, general awards of beano 
licenses would be upheld, but Taunton's decision to grant a license to a religious entity while 
denying a license to a secular one would be presumptively invalid. 
21 Religious organizations might, for example, be given preference in the award of 
income-generating concessions and franchises, or in the use of government-owned property. 
But see MAss. CoNST., amend. art. 18, § 2 (the "anti-aid" amendment). 
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§ 15.3. Governmental Agencies - Due Process and Equal Protection 
Rights. During the Survey year, in Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed that government agencies do not have 
due process or equal protection rights under the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion. 2 The case involved a claim by the Boston Housing Authority 
(' 'BHA' ') that the electricity rate set by the defendant Massachusetts 
Department of Public Utilities ("DPU"), which established the charges 
collected by the defendant Boston Edison Company, was unconstitution-
ally discriminatory because it forced the BHA to pay large amounts of 
money for electric service to apartments that had long stood vacant or 
been combined with other units. 3 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court's decision to 
dismiss the BHA's claim on the ground that a state agency may not 
challenge the acts of its "creator state." 4 The Court cited federal prece-
dents for the proposition that governmental entities do not enjoy the 
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, and may 
not sue under either federal or state civil rights statutes. 5 Similarly, the 
Court held, government agencies have no rights under articles 1, 10 or 12 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 6 The BHA, the Court found, 
therefore had no right to challenge the constitutionality of the rates set by 
the DPU. 7 
The decision in Spence appears to be correct. As the Court noted, the 
language of the constitutional provisions at issue excludes agency plain-
tiffs. 8 More importantly, however, a contrary rule would allow the courts 
to be drawn into political and policy disputes between branches of the 
executive which should be resolved by the governor and Legislature. 9 
§ 15.3. 1 390 Mass. 604, 459 N.E.2d 80 (1983). 
2 Id. at 608, 459 N.E.2d at 83. 
3 Id. at 606,459 N.E.2d at 82. The BHA also claimed that Boston Edison was in violation 
of G.L. c. 93A and its contract with the BHA. Id. 
4 Spence, 390 Mass. at 606, 459 N.E.2d at 82. 
5 Id. at 608,459 N.E.2d at 83. See, e.g., Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 193 (1923). 
6 390 Mass. at 610, 459 N.E.2d at 83. 
7 I d. at 610, 459 N.E.2d at 82. Although government agencies may not have constitutional 
rights, public officials have at least a few. In another decision during the Survey year, Town 
of Brookline v. Goldstein, 388 Mass. 443, 447 N.E.2d 614 (1983), the Court upheld portions 
of an injunction that prevented a citizen from contacting town officials incessantly, at horne 
and at work, day and night, to complain about town government on the ground that officials 
have "a legitimate expectation of privacy and freedom from harassment" by angry citizens. 
ld. at 449-50, 446 N.E.2d at 645. 
8 390 Mass. at 608, 459 N.E.2d at 83. 
9 See, e.g., G.L. c. 30, § 5, which states that inter-agency disputes should be presented to 
and resolved by order of the governor and executive council. Intrusion by the courts into 
such controversies could also compromise the governor's constitutional role as Supreme 
Executive Magistrate. See MAss. CoNST. part 2, art. l. 
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§ 15.4. Political Parties- Regulation of Primary Elections. In Democra-
tic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, 1 the United States Supreme Court 
struck down Wisconsin's attempt to require its state delegation to the 
Democratic Party convention to vote in accordance with the results of the 
state primary election, on the ground that the law violated party members' 
constitutional rights of association. In Langone v. Secretary of the Com-
monwealth,2 decided during the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court 
confronted the converse of that issue: whether a political party may 
impose significant controls on the state's conduct of a primary election. In 
this case as well, the party's interest prevailed. 
The Langone case concerned the Massachusetts Democratic Party's 
"15% rule." This rule, which first took effect in the 1982 state elections, 
provides that a statewide candidate may not be listed on the Democratic 
primary ballot unless he or she obtains at least fifteen percent of the votes 
on any ballot of the state Democratic convention. 3 The Democratic Party 
enacted the 15% rule to increase the importance of, and participation in, 
its caucuses and convention. 4 In the 1982 election, the rule eliminated two 
of the seven candidates for lieutenant governor. 5 The losers, with their 
supporters, then filed suit to enjoin its enforcement. 6 
The Court first considered whether the requirements of the state statute 
governing primaries, chapter 53 of the General Laws, conflicted with the 
15% rule and, if so, whether the statute was constitutional. 7 The provi-
sions of chapter 53, the Court noted, made it possible for candidates who 
had little or no support from the regular party membership to win the 
Democratic primary. 8 According to the Court, the constitutional right to 
freedom of association entitles a political party to an effective role in 
determining its candidates. 9 The Court found that the 15% rule was an 
appropriate method to ensure such a role, since it gave the party some 
control over its candidates without interfering with the state interest in 
eliminating party "bossism" and in giving the public control of the elec-
§ 15.4. 1 450 u.s. 107 (1981). 
2 388 Mass. 185, 446 N.E.2d 43 (1983). 
3 Jd. at 188, 446 N.E.2d at 44-45. 
4 See id. at 198, 446 N.E.2d at 50. 
5 Id. at 188-89, 446 N.E.2d at 45. 
6 Id. at 189, 446 N.E.2d at 45. 
7 Jd. at 189-94, 446 N.E.2d at 45-48. 
8 Id. at 189-94, 446 N.E.2d at 46-47. G.L. c. 53 provides that a voter may enroll at the 
polling place immediately before voting in a primary and become unenrolled the day after the 
primary. Langone, 388 Mass. at 194, 446 N .E.2d at 47. Thus it is possible to vote in a party 
primary with little more than a momentary affiliation and for reasons entirely ''inconsistent 
with or at least insupportive of the principles of the parties." ld. 
9 ld. at 190, 446 N.E.2d at 46. 
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toral process. 10 Therefore, the Court reasoned, chapter 53 would be 
unconstitutional if it conflicted with the 15% rule. To avoid "constitu-
tional difficulties," the Court construed chapter 53 as allowing the crea-
tion of party rules, such as the 15% rule, provided there was no conflict 
with the specific terms of the statute or with the constitutional rights of 
candidates or voters. 11 
The Court then considered the separate issue of whether the plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights as candidates or as voters were infringed by the rule's 
application, and decided that they were not. 12 The Court began its analy-
sis by notingthat "strict scrutiny" of the 15% rule would be required only 
"if the interests asserted by plaintiffs [were] fundamental and the infring-
ement of them [was] substantial." 13 According to the Court, the plaintiff 
candidates did not have a constitutional right to a place on the ballot, but 
the 15% rule did restrict their supporters' right to vote, which it deemed 
fundamental. The Court then decided that both voter and candidate inter-
ests were fundamental. 14 Although it found that fundamental interests 
were involved, the Court nevertheless ruled that the impact of the 15% 
rule - the elimination of the plaintiff candidates - was not substantial 
enough to trigger strict scrutiny, and required only "rational relationship" 
analysis. 15 The Court finally concluded that the 15% rule did not violate 
the constitutional rights of voters, candidates, or their supporters. 16 
Given the Court's concern for ballot access in Batchelder v. Allied 
Stores International Inc. ,17 also decided during the Survey year, the 
Court's finding in Langone is surprising. Moreover, there is also at least 
an apparent inconsistency between the Court's conclusion, in the first 
section of its opinion, that the 15% rule so seriously affected Democratic 
Party members' associational rights that the rule should take precedence 
over the Commonwealth's traditional right to regulate primaries, and the 
10 I d. at 194, 446 N .E.2d at 48. In the 1982 election, application ofthe 15% rule eliminated 
only two of the seven candidates for lieutenant governor, but rendered the United States 
Senate primary meaningless by barring the only declared challenger to the incumbent 
senator. 
11 Id. at 194, 446 N.E.2d at 48. 
12 Id. at 195-96, 446 N.E.2d at 48. The plaintiffs asserted claims under the first and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and articles 1, 9, 16 and 19 of the 
Declaration of Rights. I d. 
13 Id. at 196, 446 N.E.2d at 49 (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-44 (1972)). In a 
case decided shortly after Langone, the Supreme Court did not employ this test, but instead 
characterized its task as one of identifying and then weighing the relative importance of each 
litigant's interests. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
14 Langone, 388 Mass. at 196, 446 N.E.2d at 49. 
15 Id. at 197, 446 N.E.2d at 49. 
16 Id. at 200, 446 N.E.2d at 51. 
17 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983). See supra § 15.1 for a discussion of Batchelder. 
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Court's later finding that enforcement of the rule had only an "insubstan-
tial" impact on candidates and voters. 18 One of the purposes of the 
election process, of course, is to eliminate candidates, and, as part of that 
process, ballot access requirements are intended to, and do have, a 
"substantial" effect on candidacies. Almost any challenge by a loser or 
his or her supporters should therefore trigger "strict scrutiny" under 
traditional doctrines. 
When deciding ballot-access cases, the United States Supreme Court 
has looked less to whether the result of a requirement is substantial and 
more to whether it operates in an invidious or arbitrary manner. 19 The 
criteria of invidiousness and fair opportunity have also been applied by 
the Supreme Judicial Court in past election decisions. 20 Under this ap-
proach, the key criterion in Langone should have been whether the 15% 
rule unfairly discriminated or discouraged challenges by outsiders. In 
fact, although it used the language of substantiality, the Court did examine 
whether the 15% rule was invidious. When the Court found that the 15% 
rule did not "deny candidates access to the primary ballot in an unfair 
way," 21 the Court in essence did find that the rule was not invidious or 
arbitrary. As a result, even though the Langone Court's analysis is ques-
tionable, the ultimate holding is constitutionally correct. 
CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LA wt 
§ 15.5. Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings - Introduction. As 
Justice White stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, "there is no iron curtain 
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.'' 1 Yet a 
review of seven prisoners' rights cases decided during 1983 shows that the 
Supreme Judicial Court admitted precious little new light into the prisons 
of Massachusetts. This failure to accord prisoners greater rights was due 
in part to the prisoner-litigants' complete reliance on the United States 
18 Compare 388 Mass. at 191, 446 N.E.2d at 46, with 388 Mass. at 197, 446 N.E.2d at 49. 
19 As one commentator observed, "the vigor of judicial review of election laws has been 
roughly proportioned to their potential for immunizing the current leadership from attack." 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 774 (1978). See Jeness V. Fortson, 403 U.S. 
431, 437-40 (1971) (uniform signature requirement for candidates upheld); Williams v. 
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (statute favoring established parties and frustrating access of 
others to the ballot held unconstitutional). 
20 In 1981, for example, the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that would have 
forbidden candidates from listing themselves on the ballot as "independents," and required 
the use of the more pejorative term "unenrolled," because of its invidious nature. Bachrach 
v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 382 Mass. 268, 275-76, 415 N.E.2d 832, 836 (1981). 
21 388 Mass. at 197, 446 N.E.2d at 49. 
t Charles Wyzanski 
§ 15.5. I 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). 
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Constitution to the exclusion of arguably broader grounds available in 
cognate state constitutional provisions. 2 It was also attributable, how-
ever, to the Supreme Judicial Court's unwarranted reluctance to recog-
nize provisions of Massachusetts law as creating a liberty interest cogniz-
able under the United States Constitution. 
The federal Constitution entitles prisoners to due process if certain 
underlying substantive rights are at stake. These rights may originate from 
provisions other than the fourteenth amendment's due process clause 
itself. 3 For example, under the first amendment, prisoners have the right 
to limited free speech, 4 to the reasonable exercise of religion, 5 and to 
access to the courts. 6 Under the eighth amendment, prisoners have the 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment7 and, under the 
fourteenth, from racial discrimination. 8 In addition, when a liberty inter-
est originates in the state law rather than in other provisions of the federal 
Constitution, due process may also be invoked through the federal due 
process clause. Thus, when guaranteed by state law, a prisoner cannot be 
transferred into administrative segregation9 or a mental hospital, 10 and 
may not be deprived of good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in 
prison, 11 or excluded from probation, 12 or parole 13 without due process of 
law. 
§ 15.6. Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings - Failure to Prop-
erly Support Allegations. During the Survey year, in two separate lawsuits, 
claims made by a prisoner, Anthony Jackson, to due process protection 
were denied for failure to show that any underlying constitutional right 
was affected. In the first case, Jackson v. Hogan, 1 Jackson alleged that 
various defendants, employees of the Department of Correction, violated 
his civil rights by refusing to transfer him from an isolation to a "cadre" 
unit, by denying him the opportunity to hold an inmate job through which 
2 See Attorney General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 7% n.5, 444 N.E.2d 915, 919 n.5 
(1982), and cases cited therein for a broader interpretation. 
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,§ 1 provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 
4 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
5 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam). 
6 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
7 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1973). 
8 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1%8) (per curiam). 
9 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). 
10 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
11 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
12 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
13 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
§ 15.6. 1 388 Mass. 376, 446 N.E.2d 692 (1983). 
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he could earn money and good-time credit, by refusing to permit him to 
attend religious services, and by not allowing him to purchase fruit. 2 The 
Court, noting that Jackson was classified as a maximum security prisoner, 
found that Jackson had failed as a factual matter to support his allegation 
that due to racial discrimination he had been refused transfer from an 
isolation segregation unit to a cadre unit. 3 Similarly, according to the 
Court, Jackson, in connection with his second claim, failed to allege that 
the state had guaranteed anyone with his security status eligibility to earn 
good-time credits for time served. 4 Furthermore, had he been eligible for 
such a right, the Court stated, the right "could also be constitutionally 
restricted by rules stemming from valid penological concerns, such as 
security and order." 5 
Jackson's other constitutional contentions failed on legal rather than 
factual grounds. Addressing the religious issue, the Court found that 
Jackson had no unlimited right to attendance at group services in the free 
exercise of his religion. 6 The Court stated: "[W]hen an institutional re-
striction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee, ... the practice 
must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison administra-
tion, safeguarding institutional security." 7 This was satisfied, in the 
Court's view, by the unrebutted affidavit of Deputy Superintendant Vose, 
which stated that Jackson's security status prohibited his attendance at 
regular religious services but that a minister would be provided upon 
special request. 8 Finally, the Court held that the denial of an opportunity 
to purchase fruit did not rise to the level of a legally protected right and 
could be refused Jackson on any basis. 9 
In Jackson's second appeal, Jackson v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 10 
the Court reviewed a full factual record developed by a special master. 11 
In this case, Jackson sought to enjoin his transfer by the Commissioner of 
the Department of Correction (the "Commissioner") from a medium to a 
maximum security institution, arguing that the classification board had 
2 I d. at 377, 446 N .E.2d at 694. A cadre is a core group of residents with special skills, 
such as cooking, that provides services to a state correctional facility. ld. at 378 n.2, 446 
N.E.2d at 694 n.2. See 103 C.M.R. 453.06(1) (1978). The plaintilt also alleged that his 
personal property was improperly confiscated. 388 Mass. at 380, 446 N.E.2d at 695. The 
Court denied defendant Vose summary judgment on this issue. I d. 
3 388 Mass. at 378, 446 N.E.2d at 694. 
4 Id. at 379, 446 N.E.2d at 695. 
5 ld. 
6 Id. at 382, 446 N.E.2d at 6%-97. 
7 Id. at 381, 446 N.E.2d at 6% (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). 
8 Id. at 381, 446 N.E.2d at 6%. 
9 Id. at 383-84, 446 N.E.2d at 697. 
10 388 Mass. 700, 448 N.E.2d 60 (1983). 
11 Id. at 701, 448 N.E.2d at 61. 
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recommended the transfer either in retaliation for his frequent litigation 
against the Commissioner, or, alternatively, that the transfer resulted 
from a procedurally defective disciplinary hearing. 12 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the special master's finding that 
no facts supported the allegation of retaliation. 13 The Court found that the 
Commissioner's decision was based instead on a good faith and reasona-
ble review of Jackson's entire institutional record, the serious criminal 
offenses for which he had been convicted, the length and consecutive 
nature of many of his sentences which provided him a strong incentive to 
escape, and the risk to the public in the event he succeeded. 14 The Court 
did not consider or decide whether the antecedent disciplinary reports and 
hearing were procedurally flawed, as Jackson alleged. 15 The Commis-
sioner's good faith and reasonable review of Jackson's record, the Court 
stated, superseded the reports and hearing, making them "largely irrelev-
ant" to the classiftcation board's transfer decision. 16 
In both of Jackson's lawsuits, the Court unerringly identified what 
were, and what were not, the constitutional interests deserving of due 
process protection. The right to buy fruit, while doubtless important to 
the prisoner deprived of so much else, cannot, as a constitutional or 
practical matter, be the subject of judicial oversight. On the other hand, 
an individual's reasonable opportunity to exercise religion, his access to 
the courts, and his freedom from racial discrimination are rooted in the 
constitution and are fundamental both to the individual and to the integ-
rity of the correctional system. 
The difficulty in the Court's result is practical, although perhaps less 
troubling because it concerns a self-confessed "chronic litigator." 17 The 
problem is whether curtailment of the exercise of religion or state-
guaranteed good-time rights should be tolerated simply on the basis of a 
conclusory affidavit of a prison official that prison security or the pris-
oner's security status requires it. If constitutional guarantees are so easily 
avoided, due process need never attach, and prisoners, Justice White 
notwithstanding, might just as well be curtained off from constitutional 
protection. 
§ 15.7. Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings - Identification of a 
Liberty Interest. The critical importance of due process protection in a 
12 Id. at 703, 705, 448 N.E.2d at 62-63. 
13 Id. at 704, 448 N.E.2d at 63. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. at 705 n.4, 448 N.E.2d at 63 n.4. 
16 Id. at 705-06, 448 N.E.2d at 63. 
17 Id. at 704 n.3, 448 N.E.2d at 62 n.3. 
17
Golann: Chapter 15: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
468 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 15.7 
custodial setting is well-illustrated in five other prisoners' rights cases. All 
of the cases were argued before a Supreme Judicial Court panel on the 
same day and all were decided unanimously in opinions written by Justice 
Liacos. In all of them, prisoners claimed violations of due process and 
sought reversal of the sanctions that resulted. In contrast to the Jackson 
cases, 1 the alleged underlying constitutional interests were not clearly 
delineated and did not originate in other than the fourteenth amendment 
due process clause provisions of the United States Constitution. 
In each case, the Court's fundamental constitutional analysis was two-
fold. First, the Court looked at the sanction imposed to determine 
whether it affected a "liberty interest" which required any amount of due 
process. If a liberty interest could be identified, the Court then determined 
what level of due process was appropriate in light of the importance of the 
interest, and whether the challenged procedures were constitutionally 
sufficient. 2 
1. Isolation Time. The critical importance of the threshold liberty inter-
est question was highlighted by the plaintiffs' failure to satisfy it in 
Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction. 3 In Cassesso, two inmates 
received sanctions of fifteen days in isolation and a recommendation of 
reclassification and transfer to a higher security institution following a 
disciplinary board proceeding. 4 The disciplinary board had found the 
inmates guilty of major institutional misconduct after hearing, out of their 
presence, the testimony of a Superintendent Walsh. 5 The superinten<!ent 
had testified concerning the personal observations of, and information 
conveyed to him by, a Trooper Sterling and an unnamed inmate. 6 This 
information was considered by the board but not disclosed to the inmates 
pursuant to the informant privilege embodied in the administrative Code 
of Massachusetts Regulations. 7 The inmates challenged the action of the 
disciplinary board, claiming deprivation of their federal due process 
rights. 8 The Commissioner moved for summary judgment. A judge of the 
superior court granted the motion, and the Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed. 9 
In its opinion, the Court acknowledged that the procedure had probably 
§ 15.7. 1 See supra § 15.6. 
2 Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 388-89, 456 N.E.2d llOO, ll06 
(1983). 
3 390 Mass. 419, 456 N.E.2d ll23 (1983). 
4 Id. at 422, 456 N.E.2d at ll25. 
5 Id. at 421-22, 456 N.E.2d at ll25. 
6 Id. at 421, 456 N.E.2d at ll25. 
7 Id. See 103 C.M.R. § 430.15 (1978). 
8 Cassesso, 390 Mass. at 420, 456 N.E.2d at ll24. 
9 ld. 
18
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been flawed, as the inmates had claimed. 10 State and federal case law, the 
Court noted, support the argument that the informant privilege does not 
attach to an officer of the law. 11 Yet, according to the Court, the inmates 
did not meet the threshold requirement for establishing deprivation of a 
constitutional right because they had "not argued that they suffered a loss 
of liberty under the United States Constitution,'' 12 nor had they argued a 
state-created liberty interest in the procedures governing disciplinary 
hearingsY Consequently, the Court found that the inmates had failed to 
state a claim on which relief could be granted, and summary judgment was 
therefore appropriate. 14 
The Court's decision in Cassesso may be no more than the result of 
inept pleading in the trial court. Rather than asserting just their interest in 
avoiding transfer, the plaintiffs could have argued a constitutional interest 
in avoiding isolation time sufficient to trigger some level of due process. 
Isolation time represents the kind of grievous loss that the United States 
Supreme Court suggested, in Meachum v. Fano, 15 might impinge on a 
state-created liberty interest and trigger due process protection, at least 
when coupled with an "explicit mandatory" state regulation. 16 In Mea-
chum, an inmate housed in the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at 
Norfolk ("M.C.I. Norfolk"), sought to block his reclassification and 
transfer to the less favorable living conditions of the Massachusetts Cor-
rectional Institution at Walpole ("M.C.I. Walpole") on due process 
grounds. 17 A majority of the Supreme Court held that due process, under 
the United States Constitution, did not attach because the inmate's con-
viction had ''sufficiently extinguished his liberty interest to empower the 
State to confine him in any of its prisons." 18 Moreover, according to the 
Court, Massachusetts had not created a state liberty interest because, 
insofar as the Court had been advised, Massachusetts law "conferred no 
right on the prisoner to remain in the prison to which he was initially 
assigned, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of misconduct." 19 
The Meachum Court carefully noted, however, that these facts did not 
entail disciplinary confinement. 20 The Supreme Court quoted with ap-
proval the language of Wolff v. McDonnell, 21 that ''a convicted felon does 
10 Id. at 423, 456 N.E.2d at 1126. 
11 ld. at 423 n.5, 456 N.E.2d at 1126 n.5. 
12 Id. at 424, 456 N.E.2d at 1126. 
13 Id. at 424 n.6, 456 N.E.2d at 1126 n.6. 
14 Id. at 424, 456 N.E.2d at 1127. 
15 427 u.s. 215 (1976). 
16 See id. at 226. 
17 ld. at 222. 
18 Id. at 224. 
19 Id. at 226. 
20 Id. at 222. 
21 418 u.s. 539 (1974). 
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not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of his conviction and 
confinement in prison." 22 In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that prisoners 
are entitled to due process when good-time credits are subject to forfei-
ture, noting that "it would be difficult for the purposes of procedural due 
process to distinguish between the procedures that are required where 
good time is forfeited and those that must be extended when solitary 
confinement is at issue." 23 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 24 a 
companion case to Meachum, held that minimum due process applied 
where named plaintiffs were placed in punitive segregation for thirty days 
and had their classification downgraded. 25 Although no state-created lib-
erty was identified, it was apparently enough that one of the inmates was 
subject to loss of privileges and that all had been brought before prison 
disciplinary hearings for allegedly serious misconduct. 26 
Whether or not the United States Constitution itself mandates due 
process when prisoners are placed in isolation, Massachusetts regulations 
seem to create a liberty interest - a legitimate expectation in inmates that 
they will not be subject to isolation absent due process. In Massachusetts, 
isolation is not the sort of confinement that inmates reasonably anticipate. 
Isolation time, like forfeiture of good-time credits, is a major sanction. 27 
According to administration regulations the Commissioner of Correction 
can impose major sanctions only after convening a formal disciplinary 
board. 28 The regulations further require that advance notice to the inmate 
of the charges "shall be served," that the inmate "may" be represented 
and may record the hearing, that the hearing board "shall" be impartial, 
and that the inmate "shall" have limited rights to call favorable witnesses 
and confront and cross-examine adverse ones. 29 Isolation can then be 
recommended only if the inmate is found guilty, and he may not sub-
sequently be placed in isolation without having waived his right to ap-
peal. 30 In short, Massachusetts regulations are couched in language of an 
unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 
"shall," "will" or "must" be employed and that isolation will not occur 
absent a specified substantive predicate, that is, a guilty finding of major 
22 Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)). 
23 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571 n.19 . 
.. 425 u.s. 308 (1976). 
23 ld. at313. 
26 ld. at 323. 
27 103 C.M.R. § 430.23(3) (1978). 
28 ld. 
29 ld. §§ 430.11-.14. 
30 ld. §§ 430.16(2), 430.20. 
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misconduct. 31 Consequently, in future cases similar to Cassesso, the 
Court should find that inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding isolation 
time which requires due process protection, assuming the complaint is 
properly pleaded. 
While the outcome in Cassesso may signify no more than poor plead-
ing, other prisoners' rights cases during the Survey year manifested the 
Court's reluctance to address the substantive constitutional issues in-
volved in the imposition of isolation. The Court in several instances 
invoked the mootness doctrine to avoid the issue. In both Nelson v. 
Commissioner of Correction,32 and Real v. Superintendent, Ma-
ssachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, 33 plaintiffs challenged the 
isolation time imposed by the Commissioner of Correction. The Supreme 
Judicial Court refused to consider the question in either case because the 
plaintiffs had already served their isolation time. 34 By invoking the moot-
ness doctrine, the Court displayed a general deference to prison adminis-
tration. The Court fully set out its basis for applying the doctrine in Stokes 
v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole. 35 In 
Stokes, an inmate challenged his continuing placement in the Department 
Segregation Unit ("D.S. U. ")at M.C.I. Walpole for failure to provide him 
with a status review hearing pursuant to regulations. 36 A status hearing 
was held after commencement of the legal action, but before the superior 
court decided the case. 37 Justice Nolan, writing for the Court, concluded 
that the case was moot because there was "no strong likelihood that the 
same dispute [would] recur between the same parties." 38 
Because the issue of isolation time already served had been raised three 
times in one term, the Court should have recognized the well-established, 
and frequently used, exception to the mootness doctrine. This exception 
applies when controversies, which are not likely to recur between the 
same parties, are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 39 The 
31 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1983) (state regulations held to create 
liberty interest in not being placed in administrative or non-punitive segregation); Ecomoto 
v. Wright, 462 F. Supp. 397, 402-03 (N.D. Calif. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978) (state 
regulations held to create liberty interest in not being placed in administrative solitary 
confinement). 
32 390 Mass. 379, 456 N.E.2d llOO (1983). 
33 390 Mass. 399, 456 N.E.2d llll (1983). 
:w Nelson, 390 Mass. at 381 n.5, 456 N.E.2d at ll02 n.5; Real, 390 Mass. at 403 n.8, 456 
N.E.2d at 1ll4 n.8. 
35 389 Mass. 883, 452 N.E.2d ll23 (1983). Although Stokes did not raise a constitutional 
issue, the Court expressed its reason for invoking the mootness doctrine in prisoner rights 
cases most clearly in that case. 
38 Id. at 885, 452 N.E.2d at ll24. 
37 ld. 
38 Id. at 887, 452 N.E.2d at ll25. 
39 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. ll3, 124-25 (1973); Blake v. Massachusetts Parole 
Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 708, 341 N.E.2d 902, 906 (1976). 
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exception should apply to the sanction of isolation time because state 
regulations require the superintendent to wait only five days before impos-
ing the sentence, not long enough for judicial review of the disciplinary 
proceeding. 40 
2. Transfer to Segregation Unit or Higher Security Prison. During the 
Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, deferring to precedent, also 
refused to recognize a liberty interest regarding disciplinary transfer of 
prisoners to a higher security prison or to segregation.41 In Nelson v. 
Commissioner of Correction, M.C.I. Norfolk inmates Nelson and 
Goldman had been accused of violating prison regulations by possessing a 
firearm and by stealing. 42 After a hearing, the disciplinary board of the 
Department of Correction found them guilty and imposed sanctions of 
thirty days isolation time, forfeiture of good time, referral of the matters 
to the district attorney, and recommendation of reclassification. 43 Both 
inmates served their isolation time and were duly reclassified from M.C.I. 
Norfolk to M.C.I. Walpole, a higher security prison. Reviewing the facts 
before it, the Court noted that the decision in the Supreme Court case, 
Meachum v. Fano 44, had concerned the very same institutions as did 
Nelson. 45 In Meachum, the Supreme Court had reviewed Massachusetts 
law and concluded that it conferred no right on a prisoner to remain in any 
particular prison. 46 According to theM eachum Court, '' [ w ]hatever expec-
tation the prisoner may have in remaining at a particular prison so long as 
he behaves himself . . . is too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger 
procedural due process protections as long as prison officials have discre-
tion to transfer him for whatever reason or for no reason at all." 47 Noting 
40 See 103 C.M.R. §§ 430.18, 430.20. 
«Nelson, 390 Mass. at 397, 456 N.E.2d at 1110; Real, 390 Mass. at 408, 456 N.E.2d at 
1117. The reluctance of the Court can be inferred from its recognition in both cases that the 
prisoners' argument, which the trial court embraced, was "based on logic," followed by 
Court opinions holding to the contrary, with citations to federal authority. See Nelson, 390 
Mass. at 397, 456 N.E.2d at 1110; Real, 390 Mass. 408, 456 N.E.2d at 1117. 
42 390 Mass. at 382, 456 N.E.2d at 1103. 
43 Id. at 384, 386, 456 N.E.2d at 1104, 1105 . 
... 427 u.s. 215 (1976). 
45 Nelson, 390 Mass. at 382, 456 N.E.2d at 1103. 
46 427 U.S. at 229. 
47 I d. at 228. In addition to Meachum, Nelson based its holding on later federal authority 
that applied the rule of Meachum in other contexts: McDonald v. Hall, ·610 F.2d 16, 18-19 
(1st Cir. 1979); Daigle v. Hall, 564 F.2d 884, 885-86 (1st Cir. 1977); Four Certain Unnamed 
Inmates v. Hall, 550 F.2d 1291, 1292 (1st Cir. 1977). Nelson, 390 Mass. at 397,456 N.E.2d at 
1110. Not cited was Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1977), which examined 
regulations postdating Meachum. The court of appeals in Lombardo saw no basis for 
concluding that the regulations, any more than the statutes or case law, created a "liberty 
interest." 548 F .2d at 15. 
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that disciplinary and administrative transfers may be ordered at the 
Commissioner's discretion, the Nelson Court found that inmates have no 
liberty interest requiring due process that can be violated by trans(er to a 
higher security unit or facility. 48 
Similarly, in Real v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional In-
stitution, Walpole, the Supreme Judicial Court found that an inmate's 
transfer to segregation does not implicate a liberty interest requiring due 
process, even if the transfer resulted from a tainted disciplinary hearing. 49 
John Real was an inmate in the general population of M.C.I. Walpole. 50 
As a result of disciplinary board findings that he had violated various 
regulations, Real was subjected to sanctions of thirty-five days isolation, 
forfeiture of good time, and a referral to the D.S. U. at M.C.I. Walpole. 51 
On appeal, the superintendent affirmed the recommendation to transfer 
Real to segregation, and the inmate was placed in the Institutional Discip-
linary Unit ("I. D. U. "),a short-term segregation disciplinary unit, 52 pend-
ing reclassification. 53 
The Supreme Judicial Court carefully noted that because the trial judge 
implicitly found that the segregation was for disciplinary reasons, the 
Court need not consider whether the statutes and regulations of the 
Commonwealth created a protected liberty interest respecting administra-
tive transfers. 54 The Court found the short-term punitive segregation to be 
similar to any other transfer, and disposed of the due process issue by 
referring to its decision in Nelson. 55 As a result, the Court found that the 
trialjudge had improperly ordered the return of the plaintiff to the general 
prison population. 56 
The Court did not find significant, nor cite, a critical change in the state 
regulations subsequent to the First Circuit decisions relied on in Nelson. 
The Court's failure to distinguish Nelson may be explained by the fact 
that the prisoner appeared prose. On January 1, 1978, the Department of 
Correction adopted the following provision: "Notwithstanding any rule or 
regulation of the department to the contrary, a resident shall not be 
transferred to a departmental segregation unit for committing a specific 
48 390 Mass. at 397, 456 N.E.2d at 1110. 
49 390 Mass. 399, 456 N.E.2d 1111 (1983). 
50 ld. at 403, 456 N.E.2d at 1114. 
"ld. at 402, 456 N.E.2d at 1114. 
~· ld. at 400 n.3, 456 N.E.2d at 1113 n.3. 
~3 Jd. at 403, 456 N.E.2d at 1114. 
~· ld. at 407, 456 N.E.2d at 1116. 
55 Jd. at 408, 458 N.E.2d at 1117. "As we have noted today, regardless of the logic of the 
trial judge's ruling, even if transfers are the direct consequence of a tainted disciplinary 
hearing, they do not implicate or infringe a state-created liberty interest protected by the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment." I d. 
58 ld. 
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punishable offense unless a disciplinary board has found him guilty of 
such specific offense and imposed a sanction . . . and the commissioner 
has made a finding . . . . '' 57 The use of unmistakably mandatory language 
in this section creates a reasonable expectation, rooted in state law, of 
substantive due process protected by the United States Constitution, 
which must be provided prior to imposition of segregation, whether tem-
porary in the I.D. U. or more permanent in the D. S. U. The trial judge in 
Nelson found the transfer punitive and the plaintiff was subjected to 
segregation as a punishment. 58 These segregated conditions were not 
reasonably anticipated by the plaintiffs, whatever the terminology of the 
Department of Correction. The Court therefore should have examined, as 
it did with good-time forfeiture, how much due process was owed Real 
before he could be segregated and if that standard had been met. 
The failure of the Court to consider the issue is particularly difficult to 
reconcile with Royce v. Commissioner of Correction. 59 In Royce, the 
Commissioner was found in violation of the same section of regulations 
that governs the transfer of prisoners to D. S. U. 60 The prisoner plaintiff 
had allegedly been confined to the D.S.U. for two years without ever 
having received a classification hearing and a resulting order that he be 
placed in segregation. 61 Because the inmate had not been reclassified, the 
Court assumed he was in the D.S.U. as an inmate in administrative 
segregation awaiting action. 62 According to the Court, the two-year period 
violated Department of Correction rules requiring weekly status re-
views. 63 While not reaching the constitutional question, the Royce Court 
indicated that the mandatory language in the "intricate classification 
procedures" required by the 1978 regulations before transferring an in-
mate to the D. S. U. appeared to create binding regulations, and failure to 
follow them gave rise to a viable cause of action. 64 
Finally, in Lamoureux v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional 
Institution, Walpole, the Court considered whether due process applies to 
non-punitive or administrative segregation. 65 When the superior court 
heard the case, Lamoureux had been temporarily placed in the D.S.U. at 
M.C.I. Walpole awaiting reclassification. 66 A disciplinary board had 
57 103 C.M.R. § 421.07(2) (1978). 
58 390 Mass. at 401, 456 N.E.2d at 1113. 
59 390 Mass. 425, 456 N.E.2d 1127 (1983). 
60 See 103 C.M.R. § 421.07 (1978). 
61 Royce, 390 Mass. at 427 n.4, 456 N.E.2d at 1128 n.4. 
62 Id. at 429, 456 N.E.2d at 1129-30. 
63 Id. at 430, 456 N.E.2d at 1130. 
64 Id. at 428, 430, 456 N.E.2d at 1129-30. 
65 390 Mass. 409, 411, 456 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (1983). 
66 Id. at 413, 456 N.E.2d at 1121. 
-
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found him guilty of participation in a planned violent takeover of M.C.I. 
Walpole and recommended his reclassification to the D.S.U., along with 
other sanctions. 67 The trial judge found constitutional defects in the dis-
ciplinary hearing and ordered the inmate returned to the general prison 
population. 68 According to the trial court, Lamoureux's transfer to segre-
gation was an administrative, and not a punitive decision. 69 On appeal, the 
Supreme Judicial Court found a protected liberty interest in state regula-
tions governing administrative segregation of inmates awaiting investiga-
tion of misconduct or posing a security risk, and ruled that some level of 
due process was required, in contrast to its reasoning in Real. 70 
Constitutional adjudication should not tum on fine distinctions such as 
between administrative and punitive segregation. The Lamoureux Court 
noted rather archly that "the defendant and plaintiff have done little to 
make clear to us the morass of statutes, rules, and regulations surrounding 
isolation or solitary confinement, segregation, or separate confinement 
(administrative and disciplinary), and transfers (administrative and puni-
tive) . . . . " 71 Consequently, the Court should not have decided the issue 
on such a narrow difference. 
3. Good-Time Credits. Although prisoners were frustrated in their at-
tempt to show a liberty interest in transfer to isolation or segregation units 
during the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court was willing to invali-
date Department of Correction hearing procedures on due process 
grounds where good-time credits were involved. In Wolffv. McDonnell, 
the United States Supreme Court had already identified a number of 
minimum requirements of procedural due process when the forfeiture of 
good-time credit was at issue. 72 According to Wolff, a prisoner must be 
afforded: (1) advance written notice of the alleged violation of the discip-
linary rules; (2) an impartial tribunal; (3) a written statement by the fact 
finders of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary 
action taken; and (4) the right to call witnesses and present documentary 
evidence if not "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional 
goals." 73 Because of the high risk of reprisal, the Court stopped short of 
imposing constitutional requirements as to confrontation and cross-
examination of adverse witnesses. 74 It was left to the sound discretion of 
67 ld. 
68 Id. at 411, 456 N.E.2d at 1119. 
69 See id. at 416, 417, 456 N.E.2d at 1122. 
70 Id. at 417, 456 N.E.2d at 1122. 
71 Id. at 411 n.7, 456 N.E.2d at 1120 n.7. 
72 418 u.s. 539, 563-72 (1974). 
73 ld. at 566. 
74 ld. at 567-69. 
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corrections officials to fashion measures that would minimize the risks of 
error and unfairness to the prisoner on the one hand, and avoid disruption 
in the prison on the other. 75 
In Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 76 the inmate challenged the 
constitutionality of the measures adopted by the Commissioner which 
provided that informant information could be considered by the discipli-
nary board outside of the presence of the inmate. 77 Nelson had been 
accused of possession of a firearm and stealing in violation of prison 
regulations. 78 The evidence presented at the disciplinary hearing con-
sisted of the testimony of the deputy superintendent, who stated that he 
had received information from a "reliable informant" that Nelson had 
broken into an office at M.C.I. Norfolk, stolen a gun and sold it to another 
inmate. 79 The informant alleged that the other inmate charged in the 
incident, Goldman, knew where the gun was. 80 The disciplinary board 
adjourned in executive session to determine if disclosure of the informant 
or informants would create a substantial risk of harm and if their informa-
tion was reliable. 81 The deputy superintendent presented the informant 
information and withdrew. 82 
At the conclusion of the executive session, the chairman announced 
that the information was reliable, that it had been independently corrobo-
rated, and that the informant would not be disclosed. 83 The only evidence 
offered in corroboration was an incident report and the testimony of a 
corrections officer that, at some time on the day of the alleged break-in, he 
had seen Nelson with another inmate near the office. 84 The discipl)nary 
board found Nelson guilty and imposed loss of good-time, isolation, and 
recommendation of transfer. 85 
The Court found the informant procedures insufficient where the discip-
linary board sought "to impose sanctions as severe as the sanctions in this 
case," the loss of good-time credits. 86 According to the Court, broad 
conclusory findings that a possible hazard to potential witnesses and 
institutional security existed did not justify consideration of hearsay in-
75 ld. at 568. 
76 390 Mass. 379, 456 N.E.2d 1100 (1983). 
77 ld. at 380-81, 456 N.E.2d at 1102. See 103 C.M.R. §§ 430.14(3), 430.15 (1978). 
78 390 Mass. at 382, 456 N.E.2d at 1103. 
79 Jd. at 382-83, 456 N.E.2d at 1103. 
80 Id. at 383, 456 N.E.2d at 1103. 
81 ld. 
82 Jd. at 384, 456 N.E.2d at 1103. 
83 Jd. at 384-85, 456 N.E.2d at 1103-04. 
84 Id. at 384, 456 N.E.2d at 1103-04. 
85 Jd. at 384, 456 N.E.2d at 1104. 
86 Id. at 393-94, 456 N.E.2d at 1109. 
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formation. 87 The record, the Court held, must establish some facts by 
which a reviewing court could reasonably conclude that the board in-
quired and found the informants or their information reliable. 88 The Court 
therefore remanded the case, ordering that the inmates' good-time credits 
be restored or that a new hearing be held. 89 
In Lamoureux v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institu-
tion, Walpole, the Court found the record of the disciplinary hearing 
inadequate to protect due process rights. 90 A correctional officer had 
alleged that, based on his investigation and on reliable informant informa-
tion, inmate Lamoureux had participated in a planned violent takeover of 
M.C.I. Walpole by the manufacture of weapons at the institution foun-
dry. 91 The board reviewed the informant information outside the presence 
of the inmate and accepted it. 92 The board's written summary of the 
evidence did no more than state that the informants had been used in the 
past, had proved reliable, and had no motives or inducements. 93 The 
board did not indicate what the information was or whether it was person-
ally known to the informant. 
The Court held that, while the board had adequately indicated the basis 
for believing the informants credible, thus satisfying the requirements set 
forth in Nelson, the board must also indicate the extent to which the 
information was probative. 94 The board, according to the Court, was 
constitutionally required to record the informants' statements in factual 
rather than conclusory terms and to establish, by the specificity of the 
statements, that they were made from the informants' personal know-
ledge.95 
4. Inmate Witnesses. In Real v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correc-
tional Institution, Walpole, the Court was receptive to the prisoner's 
position with respect to another procedural issue left unresolved by Wolff 
87 Id. at 394, 456 N.E.2d at 1109. 
88 Id. at 396, 456 N.E.2d at 1110. 
89 Id. at 398, 456 N.E.2d at 1111. 
90 390 Mass. 409, 456 N.E.2d 1117 (1983). 
91 /d. at 412, 456 N.E.2d at 1120. 
92 Id. at 412-13, 456 N.E.2d at 1120. 
93 Id. at 414, 456 N.E.2d at ll2l. It is unclear whether it was the knowledge of the 
reporting officer or of the members of the disciplinary board that established the informant's 
credibility. 
94 Id. at 415, 456 N.E.2d at ll22-23. 
95 Id. at 414, 456 N.E.2d at ll2l. In Nelson, the Court suggested it might carry these 
requirements even further. Although not argued by counsel, the Court noted that when 
"essential to a fair determination of a cause, the disclosure of an informant's identity and 
the contents of his communication may be required on pain of dismissal." 390 Mass. at 394 
n.19, 456 N.E.2d at 1109 n.19 (quoting Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957)) 
(emphasis in original). 
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v. McDonnell. 96 The issue in Real was whether federal due process 
requirements impose a duty on the disciplinary board to explain, in any 
fashion, at the hearing or later, why witnesses the prisoner sought to call 
were not allowed to testify. 97 The pertinent state regulations did not 
require it. 98 
Real had been charged with disobeying an order and with various 
serious violations impairing the security and orderly running of M.C.I. 
Norfolk. 99 He requested representation of counsel, the presence of the 
reporting officer, and two inmates as witnesses in his defense. 100 These 
requests were denied. 101 
The Supreme Judicial Court invalidated the disciplinary hearing and its 
sanctions on the ground that the prison authorities had made no explana-
tion for the denial of inmate witnesses. 102 The Court stated that the right to 
call witnesses is important to a prisoner who faces a severe credibility 
problem when trying to disprove the charges of a prison guard. 103 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the administrative record must 
justify a decision not to call witnesses, lest the hearing become a mere 
charade. 104 The Court indicated, however, that this requirement might 
well not apply to a decision to place an inmate in administrative segrega-
tion.105 In such an instance, according to the Court, " 'an informal nonad-
versary evidentiary review [may be] sufficient with merely some notice of 
the charges against [the prisoner] and an opportunity to present his 
views.' " 106 
In summary, during the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court nar-
rowly applied the threshold liberty interest test to prison disciplinary 
hearings. It relied on federal constitutional law and precedent to find 
isolation time and punitive transfer - either to other institutions or to 
segregation within the institution - outside the reach of the procedural 
protections ·of the due process clause. The decisions do not, however, 
clearly foreclose new attempts to establish liberty interests in these and 
other contexts through the state constitution and through more vigorous 
and thorough exposition of the Department of Correction's own regula-
98 See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. 
87 Real, 390 Mass. at 405, 456 N.E.2d at ll15. 
88 103 C.M.R: § 430.14 (1978). 
88 390 Mass. at 402, 456 N.E.2d at ll14. 
100 Id. at 403, 456 N.E.2d at ll14. 
101 Jd. 
102 Id. at 407, 456 N.E.2d at 1ll6. 
103 Id. at 406, 456 N.E.2d at 1ll6. 
104 Id. at 406-07, 456 N.E.2d at 1116. 
105 ld. at 407, 456 N.E.2d at 1116. 
106 Id. at 407 n.11, 456 N.E.2d 1116 n.ll (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 
(1983)). 
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tions. Together with the Court's willingness to look critically at prison 
procedures, new life may yet be found in the due process clause. 
§ 15.8. Right to Privacy - Sexual Acts. Two cases during the Survey 
year involving private consensual sexual behavior between adults impli-
cated the constitutional right to privacy. In Commonwealth v. Walter, 1 
the defendant was convicted of prostitution. 2 She had solicited customers 
for massage in a newspaper advertisement. 3 When an undercover police-
man responded, she had, for a fee, performed a sexual act for him. 4 
The Supreme Judicial Court declined to extend a constitutional right to 
privacy, either under the federal or Massachusetts constitution, to a 
person engaged in indiscriminate sexual acts for hire. 5 The Court referred 
to the impersonal nature of the performance, its availability to anyone 
willing to pay, and concluded that it did not involve "the type of intimate, 
personal decision which is protected by the right to privacy.'' 6 
In Commonwealth v. Stowall, 7 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss a 
complaint against her for adultery. 8 The trial court reported the question. 
The defendant had flagged down a passing van and, after a short conversa-
tion with the driver, proceeded with him to a secluded, wooded area. 9 She 
was seen by police through the rear window of the van having sexual 
relations with the mhle driver. 10 Later, the defendant admitted that she 
was married to someone else. 11 
The Court decided that the defendant was not protected by any privacy 
right under the United States Constitution. 12 According to the Court, any 
personal right to commit adultery free from prosecution was not ''funda-
mental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," as were those 
rights relating to marriage, procreation, and family relations. 13 On the 
other hand, the Court found that the state had a legitimate interest in 
preserving the institution of marriage and could therefore prohibit adul-
tery.14 
§ 15.8. 1 388 Mass. 460, 446 N.E.2d 707 (1983). 
2 ld. at 461, 446 N.E.2d at 708. 
3 /d. 
4 /d. at 462, 446 N.E.2d at 709. 
5 ld. at 465, 446 N.E.2d at 710. 
6 /d. 
7 389 Mass. 171, 449 N.E.2d 357 (1983). 
8 Id. at 172, 449 N.E.2d at 358. 
9 /d. 
10 Id. at 172, 449 N.E.2d at 359. 
II /d. 
12 /d. at 173-76, 449 N.E.2d at 359-61. 
13 Id. at 174, 449 N.E.2d at 360. 
14 ld. at 175, 449 N.E.2d at 360. 
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The Court's analysis and conclusion in Walter is difficult to fault. 
Clearly, Waher's advertisement and indiscriminate behavior belied any 
asserted privacy interest. Stowall's claim was similarly affected, although 
the Court did not explicitly advert to it. The casual and open cir-
cumstances under which she committed adultery suggested no great per-
sonal concern for her privacy. This openness would have been a narrower 
and sounder basis for decision than the normative and tautological state-
ment that sexual behavior, or the freedom to engage in it free of prosecu-
tion, is not fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 15 No 
one can doubt that society can proceed against the "sexual embrace at 
high noon on Times Square." 16 But to imply that any sexual conduct 
inimical to marriage may not be constitutionally protected would seem to 
go unjustifiably far to defeat legitimate expectations of privacy. 
15 See Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965) (toilet stall in public park 
used for homosexual activities held not protected for fourth amendment purposes). 
16 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973). 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/18
